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Abstract—Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANET) is emerging 
as a promising technology of the Intelligent Transportation 
systems (ITS) due to its potential benefits for travel planning, 
notifying road hazards, cautioning of emergency scenarios, 
alleviating congestion, provisioning parking facilities and 
environmental predicaments. But, the security threats hinder its 
wide deployment and acceptability by users. This paper gives an 
overview of the security threats at the various layers of the 
VANET communication stack and discuss some of the existing 
solutions, thus concluding why designing a security framework 
for VANET needs to consider these threats for overcoming 
security challenges in VANET. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The speedy aggrandizement in Wireless communication 
technologies concurrently with immediate measure requisites 
to improve road safety have expedited a considerable 
development in the (ITS). ITS came into existence with a 
strong perspective to provide end-to-end, better, worthier, 
safer, efficient and much more improved transport services, 
both on-road and off-road.  Intelligent communication 
technologies such as trip guiding smart phone applications, the 
latest safety oriented in vehicle systems (such as Anti-Lock 
Braking systems, air bags, Navigation systems, etc.), are all 
part of the ITS. Therefore, ITS is not just about modifying or 
repairing the age-old infrastructures of roads, highways, 
stations, or bus stops, but persuading security and safety of 
transport to all the people and goods travel on roads [1]. 
Wireless technologies together with in-vehicular capabilities, 
resulted in the formation of Wireless Vehicular communication 
networks termed as ‘Vehicular Ad hoc Networks’ (VANET). 
Although VANET are considered as a use case of Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks (MANETS), as VANET inherit most of the 
MANET characteristics, such as infrastructure less 
functionality (due to lack of central coordinator), self-
configuration and management of networks, and limited 
physical layer security. The high speed of vehicles, adds some 
more attributes to these common characteristics, such as more 
dynamic topology with varying density, predictable movement 
(predefined roads), and unlimited power supply. VANET can 
be briefly defined as spontaneous, self-configurable networks 
formed between moving vehicles, where each vehicle serving 
both as a mobile node and router, is equipped with wireless 
capabilities to support short range communications and can 
communicate wirelessly both with other mobile nodes 
(vehicles, and pedestrians) as well as static Road Side 
units(RSU). The vehicles, can proficiently gather and process 
surrounding data and transmit the same via messages 
containing the vehicle’s unique identifier, current position, 
timestamp, and other safety related data in a timely manner to 
nearby vehicles, thereby facilitating safe driving with, real time 
traffic assistance, accident prevention, and emergency warning 
among others. 
Considering the imperative parameters of short range 
connectivity, scalability, latency and throughput, in VANET, 
which stands them out from other wireless networks, there 
have been efforts of modifying the existing wireless 
technologies and raise new standards to fit to their needs. Thus, 
affiliated to VANET are a certain set of standards and 
protocols that have evolved to ensure invulnerable inside and 
out network design, attain impregnable message transmission, 
manage user identity and data, control access to resources, 
authorize and authenticate network users, thus safeguarding 
against tracing and hacking of user privacy. These standards 
have evolved differently in different regions namely, Wireless 
access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) in U.S. [2] and C-
ITS [3] in Europe, commonly referred to as (Dedicated Short 
range communications (DSRC) in both the regions.  
The first milestone towards standardization in US took place in 
2002 when on the appeal of ITS America the FCC allocated 75 
MHz of spectrum in the 5.9. GHz band specifically for 
connected vehicle applications. FCC initially referred to a 
single (Physical) PHY and (Medium Access Control) MAC 
standard, developed by the ASTM (ASTM E2213, published in 
2003), which was based on the IEEE 802.11A OFDM PHY. 
[4]. After IEEE incorporated all the earlier PHY and MAC 
features in single IEEE-2007 edition, the IEEE task group p 
was formed, which amended this IEEE-2007 edition especially 
for V2X (Vehicle-to-Anything) communications. This WLAN 
standard known as IEEE 802.11p [5] specifies the PHY layer 
and MAC layer for DSRC based Vehicular transmissions. 
Later, IEEE further developed the IEEE 1609 group [6] which 
established the family of protocols (IEEE 1609.x) on the top of 
this IEEE 802.11p PHY and MAC layers to provision open 
access for V2V(Vehicle-to-Vehicle) and V2I(Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure) communications. This protocol stack came to be 
known as the WAVE. Thus, the terms DSRC and WAVE are 
used interchangeably to refer to this stack. IEEE 1609 group, 
not just defined the architecture, but also developed standards 
facilitating V2V and V2I communications as shown in Figure 
1. Which depicts the WAVE stack defined in IEEE 1609.0-
2013. [30] 
 
Figure 1. WAVE Protocol Stack [30] 
To render security across the stack, this group defined the 
IEEE 1609.2 standard, which intends to provide a complete 
security framework incorporating all the security requirements 
to defend against the most common attacks. Schemes defined 
form components of Public Key infrastructure (PKI), where 
messages are securely communicated by encrypting them using 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and authenticated using 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [7]. 
ECDSA has been preferred since it delivers preeminent 
security with a smaller key size. 
Security of road users’ needs lot of attention, considering 
the use of openly accessible wireless channel by them, which 
poses threats to their security and privacy, since it gives 
attackers the opportunity to exploit the resources in an 
unauthorized way.  
This paper presents the security challenges and threats to 
WAVE enabled VANET communications comprehensively. 
After listing the security requirements essential in a robust 
VANET framework, we have defined the various attacks at 
each layer of the WAVE protocol stack and the existing 
solutions bounding the VANET communications. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
II provides the vehicular network architecture. Section III lists 
the security threats of each layer, followed by an overview of 
existing security solutions in section IV and Conclusion of the 
paper is in Section V.  
II. ARCHITECTURE 
This section discusses the core components of VANET and 
different types of communications achieved by them. Figure 2 
depicts the complete VANET architecture, containing 
components involved and communications achieved. 
A. Modules Performing Communications 
WLAN (IEEE 802.11p compliant) modules which facilitate 
V2V, V2I and V2X communications form the vital parts of 
VANET as detailed below: 
WLAN compliant OBU: The on-board unit is an in-vehicle 
DSRC enabled embedded device incorporating following 
components and devices necessary to communicate with other 
OBUs and RSU’s. These include, IEEE 802.11p radio 
transceivers, Communication Processor, Read/Write memory 
to store data captured and processed from the vehicles’ 
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and communicated to and from 
the RSU with accurate time stamp, OBD-II Interfaces to the 
vehicle’s Controller Area Network (CAN), to perform data 
acquisition from vehicle’s ECU and User Interface to access 
multiple safety and infotainment applications. 
 
Figure 2. VANET Overview (Architecture, Components and Communication)  
WLAN compliant RSU: They intrinsically contain 
navigation systems, radio transceivers supporting the openly 
available WAVE, and for more ITS applications there can be 
Wii-Fi, LTE, GPRS, WIMAX support [31, 32]. RSUs perform 
registration, association, with all the vehicles entering its 
region. Hence, it is equipped with slightly greater computation 
capabilities than the OBU and is responsible to execute three 
main functions: [8] 
•Serving as an Information source: It is the provider/host of 
numerous safety applications and holds responsibility to 
disseminate warnings or alerts to vehicles in their area, such as 
low bridge warning, or work zone warning.  Also, vehicles in 
an area can query RSUs regarding traffic on the road ahead. 
•Relaying information: It relays messages to other RSUs and 
OBUs, thus spreading information widely. 
•Internet Connectivity: Connects OBUs to internet via the 
IPv6 Gateways. 
Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) [9]: It stores users’ confidential 
data, such as private key and certificates. It is responsible to 
generate pseudo IDs and digital signatures using these Pseudo 
IDs, thereby preserving privacy and providing authentication 
of messages to the recipient. It is installed by the manufacturer 
and is only accessible to authorized parties. The users cannot 
tamper this device; else it will erase all the cryptographic 
information. 
Application Unit (AU): The application unit, equipped in the 
vehicle, (either within the OBU or as a separate unit) [10], is a 
dedicated device with user interface, which by utilizing 
OBU’s communication capabilities enables users to access 
services rendered by the RSUs. These can be safety 
applications, information services, internet connectivity or 
forwarding of its own application data widely. Depending on 
the user’s need there can be more than one application units 
serving different needs. 
B. Modes of Communication 
V2V communications: The vehicle to vehicle 
communications are achieved by direct radio connectivity 
between their respective OBUs. Embedded sensors and 
vehicles’ RADAR perform the first step of V2V i.e. Data 
Acquisition and Processing, in which surrounding data is 
captured and analyzed by the processor and the Operating 
system to identify threats such as proximity of any nearby 
vehicle exceeding speed limits, sudden brakes by a preceding 
vehicle, hidden vehicle warning, lane change warning, etc. In 
the next step, Data Transmission happens. The values 
evaluated by the vehicle are then transmitted to vehicles in the 
360-degree view of the vehicle in the form of data packets, 
every 100-300 ms according to DSRC specifications. 
V2I Communications: V2I communications allow a vehicle 
to access the applications provided by the RSU. The vehicles 
query the RSU either for gaining road and traffic information, 
accessing the internet, or relaying messages to other OBUs in 
case of multi-hop communications. 
I2V Communications: In this case, RSU’s communicate with 
the OBUs either to revert to any query raised by the 
corresponding vehicle or to forewarn of any emergency event. 
V2X Communications [11]: As defined by the 3GPP group 
vehicles performing communications with any entity other 
than the RSUs and other OBUs is called as V2X 
communication. For e.g., user accessing internet applications 
using a laptop or smartphone. 
III. VANET SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND POSSIBELE 
ATTACKS  
Despite the numerous advantages for safety and driving 
assistance, it brings along a storm of threats spanning across 
the entire WAVE communication stack causing hazards 
affecting different modes of communication (V2V, V2I, V2X).  
Following subsections discuss in detail the various security 
requirements, attacks performed by malicious users 
challenging these requirements and finally the measures to deal 
with these attacks, thus fulfilling the necessary requirements. 
A. Security Requirements of VANET 
Confidentiality and Access Control: Data Confidentiality 
ensures that the data contents are revealed only to the 
authorized individuals. In VANET confidentiality hails as a 
primitive requirement achieved by applying certain access 
control policies and cryptographic mechanisms on the stored 
and transmitted data. This requirement becomes even more 
imperative, particularly for the military application, where 
information disclosure is not just a security breach, but 
undoubtedly life threatening. 
Integrity: Integrity of data is validated, if the transmission 
of data from source to destination occurs with no external 
(unknown and unauthorized) interference and tampering, and 
accuracy and reliability of data can be ensured at the 
destination. In VANET, if a malicious attacker alters the 
transmitted data pretending to offer safety, it can lead to traffic 
congestions, or unwanted route diversions for drivers. 
 
Figure 3. Security requirements of vehicular transmissions’ 
Availability: To access the network resources, it’s 
necessary for them to be available when required in a timely 
manner. Considering stringent delay requirements of messages 
in VANET, if unnecessary message transmissions by attackers 
consumes most of the available bandwidth, it leads to DOS 
(Denial-of-service) for legitimate users. Thus, how we counter 
DOS attacks, plays crucial role in network availability for 
rightful users. 
Authentication: Authentication is the process of 
identifying network users by means of Unique ID and 
password/biometrics to grant them authorization for accessing 
the resources. It’s a necessary step in VANET to ensure both 
the message received and the sending node are authenticated. 
It’s accomplished by means of the user certificate and signature 
verification. 
Conditional Privacy preservation: Privacy refers to 
hiding critical and personal user information from unwanted 
and unauthorized entities, to ensure safety and security. In 
VANET, it is necessary to keep user’s identity a secret or use 
frequently changing pseudonyms IDs to avoid location tracking 
or impersonation. Offering complete privacy is impossible in 
VANET as the user’s identity needs to be revealed and traced 
in case of emergency scenarios such as any accident enquiry 
requiring the user’s location and personal information.  
Non-Repudiation: Non-repudiation ensures that when 
recipient identifies who the sender is, the sender takes complete 
responsibility and cannot deny sending the message. Digital 
Signatures included in the message can serve the purpose, to 
avoid any conflicts in such scenarios. 
Trust: It is emerging as the most important requirement to 
deliver a successful security framework for VANET. Although 
we can verify, and authenticate received messages, but 
considering the number of entities involved and the difference 
in their backgrounds, we cannot trust them.  
To achieve these security requirements as depicted in figure 
3, firstly we need to have a clear view of the attacks preventing 
their accomplishment and later we review some of the existing 
solutions proposed and efforts made targeting these 
requirements. 
B. Attacker Entities  
Rapacious or impatient Drivers: Under normal driving 
conditions, a driver follows rules, and is ready to go through 
congested scenarios and delivers reliable safety messages. But, 
if he turns out to be greedy, then irrespective of other road 
users’ needs he would send false messages by impersonating to 
be 100 vehicles, thus declaring congestion on the route. In 
another case, to avoid any fines or to escape from message 
forgery accusations, he might tamper vehicles’ hardware and 
Software, in the absence of TPD [11]. 
Malicious Attackers: These also cause deliberate damage, 
serving them a purpose, either for fun or accomplishment of 
any illegal activities. 
C. Attacks on the Different Layers 
As discussed earlier, the attacks span across the entire 
WAVE stack, which are listed in this section along with the 
damage they cause. 
1) Attacks at the Application Layer: The application layer 
renders the services needed for the safety and non-safety 
applications, access them from the Provider (RSU and other 
fixed infrastructure) and defines the exact message format. It 
is the responsibility of this layer to identify the reachability  of 
network providers, authenticate them, abide by necessary 
protocols and data syntax and ensure integrity of data by 
establishing trust. Following attacks on the application layer 
interrupt its normal functionalities and compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, Privacy and may also result into 
Repudiation. 
Message Falsification/tampering: It is the act of sending 
incorrect/false information in the network, either by the greedy 
drivers, or malicious intruders. To gain complete access and 
avoid congestion the driver might broadcast false messages, 
stating some accident emergency or congestion on route. In 
worst case scenario, an attacker might take over any RSU and 
send false warning, about work zone or access private 
information while other OBUs communicate with this RSU. 
Thus, message originator authentication and verification 
becomes inevitable to ensure integrity and confidentiality. 
Repudiation: If the attacker fakes another vehicles’ identity 
by replicating signatures, it can easily lead to the legitimate 
user denying of sending messages which were sent using his 
signature.  
Malware Attack: In this by faking identities, user can send 
fake software updates to the OBU, or send unnecessary 
advertisements causing bandwidth consumption. 
Location Tracking: It becomes easy for the adversary to 
perform ‘signature linking’ even from Pseudonyms if they 
aren’t changed frequently and thus makes it easy for any 
insider to track user’s activities, monitor route. 
GPS Spoofing attack: [14]. In this attack, intruders use 
simulators generating GPS signals stronger than the GPS 
satellite signals, which can alter the vehicles’ GPS device 
information, also interrupting with the working of other 
location based services and applications. [15] 
2) Attacks Targeting Network and Transport Layer 
functionalities: The network layer makes it possible to deliver 
messages by performing routing and forwarding functions, 
logical addressing, and controlling congestion. Requisite 
Single-hop, multi-hop communications are performed by 
selecting appropriate route and QOS. It performs uni-cast, 
multi-cast and broadcast transmissions and the transport layer 
enforces protocols to achieve these transmissions, also 
assuring reliable delivery of data packets. Adversaries which 
attack these layers disrupt these functionalities by following 
attacks: 
Impersonation Attack: Every vehicle associated with 
VANET is assigned with a unique ID. In this attack, an 
adversary forges the identity of a legitimate user and thus, 
enters the network falsely by claiming to be an authorized 
user. 
Sybil Attack: It is a type of impersonation attack in which the 
adversary pretends to be multiple identities [16].Due to the 
absence of central coordinator in VANET, the nodes are 
responsible for performing the routing functions, hence, the 
authentication of messages and mapping of entity to identity 
takes place at the local level, relying solely on the assumption 
of cooperation and trust among the nodes, which can easily be 
violated by an intruder. The purpose of Sybil attack lies in the 
fact of ‘believing mass messages delivering same 
information’. If a single node communicates falsely regarding 
some emergency or event, it would be difficult to trust, but 
similar data when received from multiple authorized identities 
tends to persuade the legitimate users and act in the favor of 
the adversary. It is the most treacherous and hazardous attack 
in the VANET scenario and it’s important to detect the Sybil 
nodes [9] [17].  
Black Hole Attack: A black hole is that part of the network 
which is created by an attacker, to gain access to the packets 
of a targeted node. The malicious node is the ‘black hole’ 
here, because even though it is shown a participant in the 
network, but it’s not performing the routing functions, either 
unintentionally [16], by simply opting out of forwarding 
packets or intentionally where it cleverly advertises itself to be 
on the shortest route to the destination by cheating with the 
routing protocols and convinces other gullible nodes, thus 
causing a new corrupt route formed. The sender nodes being 
unaware, keep forwarding data packets to this node, which are 
forwarded to either undesired locations or kept by the node 
itself, thus initiating ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack. [18] 
Grey Hole Attack: It is a type of Black Hole attack in which 
the black node routing the data, drops selected data packets at 
a particular time or destined for a certain node, but, at other 
times functions fine [19].  
Worm Hole attack [20]: A single or multiple malevolent 
nodes come together to launch this wormhole attack, in which 
messages received at one point are ‘tunneled’ to some other 
point and replayed from there. The attacker is either in 
possession of some cryptographic information and as a 
legitimate participant, launches this attack, or as an outsider, 
attacks in the hidden mode, with a motive to analyze traffic or 
simply launch ‘DOS’ attack, thereby dropping packets. 
Replay Attack: 
In this type of 
attack previously 
sent messages are 
replayed/re-
injected by a 
malicious node, 
to misguide the 
recipients and 
take advantage of 
the time/situation when the message was transmitted [21]. 
This affects the routing tables and thus the locations of 
recipients. 
Thus, every packet sent should include a timestamp so that the 
messages with the same content can be compared if re-
transmitted.  
3) Attacks on PHY and MAC layers: Following attacks on 
the application layer interrupt its normal functionalities.  
Denial-of-service attack: It is a type of attack in which the 
network resources are intentionally kept occupied by adversary 
to prevent the legitimate users from accessing them. The 
malevolent node would usually flood the network [16] with 
unwanted messages such as advertisements, or replay messages 
(replay attack), or perform ‘signal jamming’. In another case, a 
malicious node can send fake emergency messages to keep the 
RSU busy to respond to other genuine requests, causing 
accidents and collisions. [9] 
Distributed DOS attack: It is a variant of the DOS attack 
where the DOS attack is carried out from different locations 
and different timings [22], creating additional problems for the 
network users. 
The DOS attacks are specific to the PHY and MAC layers, 
but all the attacks discussed above, i.e. Sybil attack, message 
falsification or other attacks at the various layers are a breach 
to the PHY and MAC layers, because they make use of the 
network resources either from the inside or outside to perform 
these attacks. 
Spamming: If intentional spam messages are injected in 
the network, it affects the channel access by other users. This is 
done to increase the transmission latency, thereby accomplish 
malicious acts [16] 
The summary of the security threats and infrastructure with 
layer wise classifications are given in Table 1. 
IV. EXISTING SECURITY SOLUTIONS  
Researchers have been extensively analyzing the attacks 
and security requirement of VANET, starting with the first of 
efforts by [9], [23], [24] [25]. Raya et al. [9] have highlighted 
the security threats of VANET for the first time, and addressed 
solutions to facilitate secure vehicular communications. In this, 
the authors propose a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) System, 
to render all the above discussed security requirements. 
Methods for storing and distribution of public and private key, 
certification and revocation are addressed. Furthermore, 
privacy preservation is addressed by means of Electronic 
License Plate (ELP) and anonymous key pairs. For 
authenticating safe messages, Digital Signatures are proposed 
to verify the authenticity of messages. The Tamper-Proof 
device in the vehicle is the store-house of all the cryptographic 
information, and is thus responsible for storing the private key 
used to generate the digital signatures and signing messages. 
Keeping in view, the stringent delay requirement, authors have 
also stated the advantages of ‘Group Communication’ for 
quicker authentication of emergency messages. 
In [26], authors have proposed a ‘Global security 
architecture’, which does not mention any standardizations, but 
describes a layer wise architecture, keeping all the security 
requirements at different levels of communication into 
consideration. The material level security comprises of the 
security of different modules which are adding to different 
steps of communication, & responsible for acquiring and 
transmitting data, for e.g. OBU, GPS, antennas, etc. These can 
be secured by the addition of a TPM [27] connecting them. The 
authentication level deals with the authentication of entities and 
data at different points of communication. This includes node 
authentication and association before entering network as well 
as data verification in communication. Also, authentication of 
user’s location is performed to validate the position of the 
node. The trust level is meant to ensure the trustworthiness of 
different nodes and make sure that nodes responsible for 
transmitting the messages do not deny their participation i.e. 
non-repudiation. The message/data level ensures data security 
using Digital Signatures, and finally the cryptographic level 
ensures users’ privacy by means of identity protection and 
tracking. It also tends to protect the system from Sybil attacks. 
The above papers give a generalized overview of the 
VANET security challenges, and a survey on the existing 
solutions. But most of the recent works have targeted 
Authentication with privacy preservation. 
Huang et al. [28] have specifically defined privacy 
preserving anonymous authentication schemes. Privacy 
preserving authentication (PPA) as discussed earlier, is an 
authentication scheme, whereby users authenticate each other 
without revealing confidential information. PPA schemes are 
classified based on authentication, i.e. symmetric or 
asymmetric encryption and on the basis of privacy 
preservation. It clearly differentiates PPA, if authentication is 
done via anonymous key pairs, and only Trusted third party is 
authorized to reveal identity in abnormal scenarios or is it 
based on pseudonyms, which can be generated by the TTP, 
RSU’s or maybe the vehicle. The existing schemes 
implementing these or targeting these are discussed with their 
solutions with further challenges. Some of the emerging issues 
are the design of VANET with less dependency on the 
Infrastructure, trusting the origin and need of a heterogeneous 
solution to support interoperability among the Vehicular and 
other wireless networks (e.g. WiMAX, Cellular), etc. 
Hasrouny et al. [29] have also discussed some of the 
significant and emerging issues such as trusting the node 
disseminating data, how to check for its reliability and what 
would be the immediate and necessary actions to take if the 
node isn't impeachable and is not able to prevent malware 
attacks in the OBUs, at that point of time, it is necessary to 
protect them against malicious code installations or updates. 
Thus, with security and privacy of users, the most emerging 
issue is trust and certitude in the data origin. We need efficient, 
methodical and some business-like security frameworks with 
user privacy protection for VANET. 
 
Table 1. Attacks on layers and communication 
affected 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
The last two decades have witnessed substantial 
augmentation in the ‘connected vehicle applications’, 
incorporating Highway Traffic safety and efficiency 
applications, along with tranquil and infotainment applications. 
Despite these developments, the transportation industry lacks 
in the world-wide implementation of the proposed standards 
and on-road deployment, majorly due to security of 
communications on road. We are in desperate need of some 
robust frameworks which can efficiently fulfil the security 
requirements of VANET to avoid any setbacks caused by the 
misuse of network resources by adversaries, thus risking 
people’s life on road. The future ITS needs a lot of 
advancements in what exists today to give a better, reliable and 
a secure road experience to people on motorways. 
This paper presented a comprehensive survey of security 
threats at each layer of the WAVE communication stack, 
attacker entities responsible and effects on the vehicular 
communications. The existing solutions resolving some or 
most of these have been detailed and finally, an insight into the 
current research challenges is given to motivate researchers to 
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